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SOME PASSAGES IN PLATO'S LAWS (IV AND V)
FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN
(1) In a most solemn address {Legg. 4, 715 e Iff..) the law-
giver reminds the citizens that God controls beginning,
middle and end; next turning to Dike, God's constant compan-
ion, he finds in her train those who will achieve £u5aLUO-
VLa because they are in a healthy state of mind. Unlike
them, 6 &i tlc eFapOels utx6 uEYaAauxias, n XPi'lUCtOLv feTiaLp6-
uevoc f\ TLucxLQ f| Hal aoouaroQ euuopcpugc auot ve6Tr)TL xal dvoigi.
cpA-^YExaL xr\v ipuxi^v ueO* 03pecoQ... (716 a 4-7) and (relying
on himself) aHLpxgi TapAxTOOV udvxa auoc (b 2) until he meets
his punishment. How are we to construe the five datives be-
tween uEYOtAauxLae and cpA-^yExaL? f\ xpi'lUOcoL calls for one or
several additional causes of the man's arrogance. f\ tluocCq
n Hal acouocTOQ euuopcpia would seem the minimum, but some edi-
tors and translators, notably E.B. England, E. des Places
1
)
and R.G. Bury (if I understand each of them correctly)
add the remaining two datives, without worrying whether the
words left, '^Xiyziai . . .mzQ' u3peoac, suffice to describe the
resulting condition of a soul. Actually ue^' welcomes, even
if it does not positively insist on, a partner, and this
partner would best appear in the dative case; for, as Wila-
mowitz a propos cpAdyeadaL observed: "Das Feuer oder das
Licht ist immer von dem entziindet, was in dem Dativ dabei
1) Burnet's punctuation, i.e. the commas before "f^ XP'^M^^"'-'^ ^^^ before
f] xal ocb|JXXTOc; . . .
,
puzzles me. E.B. England, The Laws of Plato (Man-
chester 1921) [ad 716 a 5) argues for the same construction that R.G.
Bury (LCL 1926) and E. des Places (Bude 1951) indicate by their render-
ing.
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steht." LSJ, s.v. q)Xiy(xi, provides this verb in our pas-
sage with two datives: ve6TriTL xal dvoLC?. cpXiysTai xfiv iJjuxt^v,
duo. being left out in the cold. How then are we to adjudi-
cate the conflicting claims of e;-n;aLp6uevoQ and (i)Xtyexai7
My answer would be that three datives: xP'i'iuaoLV, tlucilq,
euuopcpLgt indicate things to be proud of, that veixne is ac-
ceptable as companion of euuopcpia but that no one is likely
to pride himself on dvoia in the same sense as he prides
3)himself on v/ealth, honors, good looks and youthfulness
.
However, as description of a person's state of mind or soul
dvoLa associates readily with u&pLC. Between two datives a
xal could easily creep in but the text is better and clearer
without it: v] xpAucloiv enaLpouevoQ n xmaUc f\ xal acauciTOS
euuppcpLC?. dua veottixl LHal] dvoigi cpAdyexaL xf\v liiux^v \ieQ'
u3pecoQ.
(2) In the new city the first and highest honor is re-
served for the gods; yet not many people honor them in the
right way. The question t lq . . .npdg lq cpuAri xal dxoAoudoe deep;
(4.716 c 1) gives rise to an extended regulation not only
of worship but also of conduct toward kinsmen, fellow citi-
zens, strangers, etc. When the subject of "honor" is taken
up again (5.726ff.) we learn what is second in the hierarchy,
...xriv auxoO iJjux'HV uexd Oeoug . . . XLudv 6eLV Xiycov 6euxipav
opOcoQ TiapaxeAeuoucxL (726 a 6) . But again xluq, 6* coq Sttos
ELTxelv riuwv ou6eLQ opOcos , SoxeL 6^. Self-praise, self-in-
dulgence, concern about one's life in situations where it
should not be valued so highly, are some of the mistakes
people commit without realizing that each of them inflicts
dishonor on the soul. At the end of this disquisition (728
c 9ff.) Plato emphasizes once more the unique importance of
soul which, he repeats, 5euxepov fexdx^Ti xiuti ("^ 3), then
continues x6 6e xpixov, ixdQ dv xoux6 ye voT'iaeiev, xfiv xou
2) Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 411 n., whare he comments on N. 10.2 and
I. 7.23. It can hardly matter that in these passages the datives are
not pejorative.
3) Note that of the datives associated with the verb fenaCpeo^at at
Resp. 434 b 1 and 608 b 5ff. none is comparable to dvola.
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aciiiocTOS eZvai naxd. cpuaiv tlut'iv. The procedure which he at
this point suggests, tccq 5* a5 tluccq deZ okotxelv, nal toutoov
TLvee dAridELS xai, oaai Ki36n^OL (d 4ff.), parallels what he
has done first for the gods, then for the soul. Applied to
the body, it shows that neither the beautiful nor the strong
nor the swift kind is truly tlulov (d 7ff .) . In view of the
parallel procedure for gods, soul and body, I suggest that
Plato wrote at 728 d 5 tA,q 6* a5 tlu<5i.£ 6eL okotxelv xal xou-
Tou (rather than toutcov) , tCvsq 6.Xr)QeZc, xal ooai Hi^6r]Xoi
.
(3) In the subject of human motivations the Laws go their
own way. Pleasure and pain are recognized as powerful in-
fluences on hiiman conduct. A beautiful passage in Book 1
(636 d 7ff.) sets the tone for much that follows: 6uo yd-p
aijxaL nriYCil (scil. f)5ovT^ and Aunn) UE^ELVxai cpuoE l pelv, ^v
6 u^v 6,puT<5uEvos oOev te Sel xal ortixE xal oixiaov e\)6oii]ioveZ
,
... 65^ dvETXLaxriU<ivcL)Q aua nai ekx6s xcSv Katpcov xdvavxta dv
EKELVcp ^(pri . We do well to bear this thought in mind when we
read in Book 5 (733 a 9ff.) a sequence of observations con-
cerning human reactions which help Plato to lay the ground
for a KpLOLC or ovyytpioiQ 3lcov. If n6oval xal AOnaL are the
dvOpcoTiE Lov udAiaxa from which the mortal creature (dvdyKn)
dxEXVOJQ ouov EgripxfioOaL xe Kal SKHpEuduEvov ELvai... (732 e
4ff.), the right manner of "tasting" (yEUEoOai) these ex-
4)periences is all important (733 a 4-6)
.
In what follows, Plato works his way to the "right manner"
(I incorporate the changes which I think are necessary) : f]
6h 6p06xriQ tls; xoOxo fiSri ixapd xoO A6you xp^ Aau3dvovxa oko-
txelv. ELXE ouxcos f)ULV Kaxd cpuOLV TidcpuKEv ELXE dAAcoQ [ Tiapd
cpuoLv], 3lov xph Txapd 3lov t\6(.ix) nai AuTxrip6xEpov w5e okotxelv*
fi6ovi*)v 3ouA6uEOa fiuCv E^vaL, Aunnv 6^ ouO' atpouuEda ouxe
3ouA6uESa. x6 6fe uTiSdxEpov dvxl iitv fi5ovfiQ ou 3ouA6uEda,
AuTxric 6b dAAdxxEOdaL 3ouA6uEOa. Auxxriv 6' sAdxxoo uExd uelCo-
VOQ fiSovfiQ 3ouA6uEOa, fi6ovfiv 6* EAdxxco uExd UEL^ovog AurxriQ
4) See also, e.g., 2.653 a f. I cannot here deal with Plato's atti-
tude to f\5ovr] and hedonism. Suffice it to say that the argument in Book
5 results in finding greater fi6ovf) on the side of the excellences (733
e 3 - 734 e 2) .
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ou 3ouA6ue^cx. loa. &t dvxL looov endxepa xouxoov oux ^Q 3ouA.6-
ueOa <ou6' coq o6 3ouA6ueda> exoiuev dv 6ia.oa(peiv (733 a 6-
b 6). This passage, it should be realized, is not yet the
actual examination or comparison of human 3lol; rather it
leads us to the threshold of the intended comparison which
begins a few lines later (c 2: ev cp ]itv 3L(p eveoxL noXXa.
fexdxepa. .
.
)
.
I gather from E.B. England's commentary that the expres-
sion dXAcos Tiapd cpuoiv (733 a 8) caused misgivings in the
19th century. More recently toleration has prevailed. I do
not see how the expression could be justified as a pleonasm;
nor can I accept England's own defense of Tcapd (^\)oiv as an
explanation of dAAcos, a suggestion which would strike me
6 )
as improbable even if clXXcoq were = evavxLcoc.
What prompted me to add four words in the last sentence
quoted (733 b 5) was a strong feeling that after so much
moving back and forth between 3ouA6ueScx and ou 3ouA6ueda a
mere oux ^Q 3ouA6ueda could not be adequate. The content as
well as the form of the reasoning (i.e. the A6yoq a 6) so
far deployed suggest for this situation a statement of our
inability to decide between "yes" and "no". Still I would
not have trusted my feeling, if the sequel in Plato's text
had not provided support. For in the next two sentences
—
longish sentences which need not be written out—Plato in-
troduces complicating factors. Both pleasure and pain are
apt to vary in magnitude, diversity and intensity (a(po6p6-
xns) . All such variations must be taken into account, yet
the basic point of view remains the same and as soon as
5) For this reason and because it would introduce an unexpected and
(in the context) pointless thought it is not possible to understand
Loa dvTu oowv as comparing one state of equal balance with another. Tre-
vor Saunders {BIOS Suppl. 28, London 1972, 24ff.) recommends this inter-
pretation because dvxt is commonly used for exchange. This, I admit, is
the meaning in b 2 . Still "set over against" is a sufficiently well
attested meaning of dvxC (see Resp. 331 b; Phil. 63 c; Legg. 705 b) to
which LSJ is fairer than Ast's Lexicon Platonicum. England's reference
{ad c 7) to b 1 is a mistake. A presence of both emotions in equal
strength is not the same as the absence of both.
6) Cf. also the use of xaxd cpuoLv in 734 a 8f. in a sentence which
sums up the comparison of opposite pLoq.
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Plato actually begins to look at and considers the pleasure
and pain present in different types of lives, he finds a
decisive UTiep3AAAeLV in all instances but one: ev $ 5' au
3lcp LOoppoTieL, KaOdrxep ev tolq Txp6odev 5eL 6LavoeLodaL' t6v
lodpponov 3lov oag xcov u^v hnep&aXX6vTwv xcp cpiXv nuCv ^ouX6-
ueOa, xcov 6* au xolq ex^PoCe ou 3ouA6ue^O(- (733 c 6-d 2) .
tooppoTieL evidently corresponds to Caa dvxl locov of b 5 , al-
though now that matters have become more complicated, the
simple equality of b 5 is replaced by a subtle balance: in
some respects pleasures outweigh the pains; in others the
latter are stronger. If in this situation we react by a
&ouA6ue-&cx as well as by an ou 3ouA6ueSa,, we are evidently
just as stymied here (at c 7) as we were in the identical
situation at b 5, and the necessity of adding the negative
7)
clause in b 5 is proved by its presence in d 1
.
Chapel Hill
7) Despite the invaluable help provided by Saunders' Bibliography
on Plato's Laws (New York 1976), which covers the period between 1920
and 1970, I do not know whether or not others have suggested my remedy
for 732 c 1: y&^'^'^'J^'*^ '^^ eZpyeoQaL XP'^ '^^^ t^aiolcov xal 6axpCxjov . . .xaL
8Xcoq (oXriv Mss.) Tiepuxa.pei.av naaav dnoxpunxoiaevov xal TiepLoo5uv Lav
e6ax'niJ.ov£~v neupaoQai,. . . About the two clauses immediately following
I feel hopeless even if xaxd xe £6TTpaYLaq . . . xal xax' dxoxCaq (Badham
for xaxd xuxaq) is written. (I do not understand how L.A. Post, TAPA
61, 1930, 40, construes the passage.)
